Solana and Ethereum NFT thread
1/ While NFT action isn't anywhere near what the space saw in 2021, trends continue to emerge from NFT Markets.
— Messari (@MessariCrypto) October 17, 2022
Let's explore the latest on @ethereum and @solana NFT marketplaces.? pic.twitter.com/MSm5IX6Vli
2/ @MagicEden continues to dominate @solana NFTs, now capturing ~78% market share.@sudoswap AMM fork @hadeswap has moved into third place on Solana, signaling that bonding curve pricing may actually fit better on low-fee chains like Solana. pic.twitter.com/3ySnSYYK83
— Messari (@MessariCrypto) October 17, 2022
3/ While a @sudoswap fork gains market share on @solana, sudoswap itself has lost its steam, with volumes down 80% from its peak.
— Messari (@MessariCrypto) October 17, 2022
Sudoswap has managed to retain its market share gains hovering around 5%. pic.twitter.com/4EHQFanYyx
How centralized is Ethereum?
1; Eth Censorship (95% FUD, 5% todo list)
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
People asked me my opinion on the "51% censored blocks!!" MEV Watch graph that's been making the rounds, so here goes.
No original opinions here: this topic is well-covered and well-understood. I'll link those resources at the end. pic.twitter.com/eFfl0mrxrQ
2; The graphic (as used on Twitter to score InternetPointz) is clearly intended to evoke fears of a 51% attack in PoW, or of the similar thresholds in PoS.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
That is not what's happening here.
HUGE difference between:
– creating/validating a block
&
– building on prior blocks
3; Creating a block means deciding what you will put into it.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
Building on blocks means deciding whether a block *someone else* made is OK for you to build on.
%-based attacks in PoW and PoS are all about the latter: not building on prior blocks, even when they are valid.
4; A 51% attack in PoW is when you use your majority to consistently not build on others' valid blocks, presumably in order to censor the contents of those blocks.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
There are similar attacks possible in PoS when an attacker has a high % of stake.
5; In current Eth, however, **NOTHING LIKE THAT IS HAPPENING**.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
Instead, validators are excluding some transactions when *creating their own blocks*, but building on prior valid blocks as normal.
6; This presents ~zero censorship risk.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
Why?
Because 48% of validators will include your Tornado tx, and all the rest will build on those blocks. Your dirty tx is going to get in just fine.
Even just a couple % of honest validators is sufficient to stop this "censorship."
7; Is this a good situation, where 52% of validators censor at the building level?
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
NO. The right number would be 0%, and there are proposals to get there (we'll look at the end).
However, it is not a critical risk for the Eth network in any way imo.
8; If you've gotten this far, there are two obvious concerns this raises:
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
1. Is there frog-boiling risk, where people get used to progressively larger %s of stake being censored, until it's 99%+?
2. Could governments switch to forcing validators to not build on "bad" blocks?
9; For the first, you need to understand what MEV Watch tracks.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
58% of validators currently outsource their block building to mev-boost, a program that (basically) suggests optimal tx bundles for earning MEV.
To outsource, you choose a "relayer" who sends you those bundles.
10; The default relayer is run by Flashbots, and it censors OFAC-blacklisted addresses. As far as I can tell, a lot of validators just use the default relay, and thus censor in building.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
This sounds not-great for frog-boiling, since defaults tend to be sticky.
However…
11; …it also means that any validator who cares at all about censorship will be aware of this, and will not use that relayer (or will not use mev-boost).
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
This gives a hard upper bound to the % of validators that frog-boiling can capture–probably 80% or so.
12; There will likely always be a remaining 20% (at least) who care enough to do non-default setups and stop censorship, and that is plenty.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
Again, the right number of censoring validators to shoot for IS ZERO PERCENT; this is just a worst-case analysis.
13; Beyond that, there is strong social and technical pressure that can be applied to lower the censoring builder %.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
Social: pressure Flashbots to disable their default relayer. Short-term fix, but useful.
Technical: make Eth more censorship resistant at the base layer.
14; For the technical one, there are a number of plans, and they seem to be roughly 3rd on the Eth roadmap after withdrawals and data scaling (EIP-4844).
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
This podcast goes over those plans and mechanics well, so I will just link to it here:https://t.co/lhvDexQMhO
15; Now to the 2nd concern: will governments force censorship in which blocks get built on?
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
This has been discussed A LOT, and is a completely separate topic. I'll link below to some of the resources on it:
16; Eric Wall explaining how slashing the offending validators is the correct response:https://t.co/Ulm7SdTdTp
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
17; Justin Drake providing nuance as to how the initial "slash" would just be a UASF that caused a 1-2% funds loss for the offending stakers the first time, and would be a full slash the second time:https://t.co/Tj7c6NVUAK
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
18; Me walking through the basic ways that enforced attestation censorship could play out:https://t.co/TGTtrvfEgV
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
19; And here is @nic__carter trying to FUD about how slashing would work, but getting lots of important details wrong because he can't be fucked to actually read the stuff he's criticizing:https://t.co/FvJAadoXXt
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
20; Now, a couple notes.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
First, the current mev-boost thing is **NOT** a PoS vs PoW issue. Flashbots rolled mev-boost out post-PoS, but it would work just fine under PoW.
21; Second, ETH's roadmap is correct to prioritize withdrawals over build-level censorship resistance.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
The former is **critical** for social slashing and UASFs to work properly. You can't (legitimately) slash a staking provider unless people first have the option to withdrawal.
22; Build-level censorship resistance, on the other hand, is more of a nice-to-have if there is any reasonable % of ideological/altruistic/engaged validators, which is HIGHLY likely.
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
We will get it (betting against Eth core dev to ship is moronic), but it can be delayed.
23; Takeaways/Conclusion:
— T. M. Basile Genève ? ??~timluc-miptev (@basileSportif) October 17, 2022
– Eth is fine right now, and frog-boiling concerns are misplaced/handleable
– REAL 51% attacks can be handled, but staking withdrawals are critical for this
– Bitcoiner takes like this are retarded:https://t.co/tgDFskrfoj
